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In the 1990s several American states passed term limits on legislators with the stated intention of
reducing the inﬂuence of wealthy industries on career legislators. Although term limits in the United
States do not have a direct relationship to public health, the tobacco industry anticipated that term limits
could have indirect effects by either limiting or expanding industry inﬂuence. We detail the strategy of
the tobacco industry in the wake of term limits using internal tobacco company documents and a
database of campaign contributions made to legislators in term limited states between 1988 and 2002.
Despite some expectations that term limits would limit tobacco industry access to state legislators, term
limits appear to have had the opposite effect.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.In the early 1990s, 21 American states established limits on the
tenure of state legislators (National Conference of State
Legislatures, 2003). These typically constrained legislators to 6e8
years of service in any ofﬁce. Currently, after legal appeals through
state courts, 15 states retain term limits. Advocates for term limits,
many with strong links to the tobacco industry, argued that term
limits would reduce corruption by creating a citizen legislature that
was not beholden to moneyed interests, and generate “natural
campaign ﬁnance reform” by decreasing the value of legislative
seats to interest groups (Basham, 2001). We consider how term
limits affected tobacco industry political inﬂuence by reviewing
both the industry’s expectations and how their campaign contri-
butions to legislators changed before and after term limits took
effect.
The study of interest group behavior in politics is based on
theories of rational self-interest and competition for resources
(Wilson, 1995; Wright, 1995). According to this research, organi-
zations provide information, ﬁnancial resources, and popular sup-
port in the hope that policy makers will respond with favorable
legislation (Wright, 1985). Interest groups seek inﬂuence over
policy, and make campaign contributions to gain access: the op-
portunity to contact and communicate with legislators (Austen-
Smith, 1995; Grier, Munger, & Roberts, 1994; Hall & Wayman,
1990; Sorauf, 1992). Advocates for term limits, some of whom
were tobacco industry allies, claimed that interest group power
would be attenuated under term limits (Alexandar, 2011; Crane,ollonio).
All rights reserved.Belz, Kaza, & Keller, 2001). Interest groups were expected to
oppose legislative term limits because they threatened relation-
ships groups had cultivated with senior members of state
legislatures.
To date, however, themajority of studies on U.S. term limits have
focused on term limits’ other effects (Lopez, 2003). These include
changes in the composition of the legislature, the behavior of of-
ﬁceholders, and the distribution of power within legislatures
(Apollonio & La Raja, 2006; Bernstein & Chada, 2002; Carey, Niemi,
& Powell, 2000, 2006; Meinke & Hasecke, 2003; Squire, 1998).
Other studies suggest that term limits redistribute power away
from the legislature and toward other actors such as interest
groups, state executives, and the bureaucracy (Carey, Niemi, &
Powell, 1998, 2000; Moncrief, Thompson, Haddon, & Hoyer, 2001;
Peery & Little, 2002).
Most literature suggests that term limits remove sources of
leadership power, such as seniority. Such a change could force in-
terest groups to provide a wider distribution of resources to many
members, rather than channeling funds to leaders who then deliver
votes (Capell, 1996). Alternatively, interest groups could attempt to
reach more legislators, but make the same average contributions to
each recipient (Capell, 1996). Our research hypotheses are based on
these expectations.
Hypothesis 1. Interest groups should distribute campaign contri-
butions to a larger percentage of state legislators after the passage of
term limits.
Hypothesis 2. Interest group efforts to reach more legislators may
require them to spend more money on campaign contributions in the
wake of term limits.
1 Philip Morris Companies changed its name to Altria in January of 2003. How-
ever, for most of the time period considered in this paper, both the parent company
and the tobacco company subsidiaries were named Philip Morris. As a result, we
use the name Philip Morris exclusively in this paper.
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inﬂuence on state legislators could have compounding effects,
because many state legislators move to higher political ofﬁce. If
legislators are less responsive to special interests, including tobacco
interests, the effects on policy and public health could be signiﬁ-
cant. Discovering that term limits decrease interest group political
power would justify expanding them to other states and countries.
The role of the tobacco industry
Research on interest groups often extrapolates from the
behavior of a single industry or organization (Browne, 1995;
Rothenberg, 1992). Unlike many interest groups, the tobacco in-
dustry is active in state politics (Studlar, 2002). However, because
the tobacco industry is geographically concentrated (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2013), legislators from non-
tobacco states who ally with the industry are rarely responding to
local economic interests.
The tobacco industry is extraordinarily politically active
(Aguinaga Bialous & Peeters, 2012). It monitors and is active on
issues ranging from efforts to reduce cigarette litter (Smith &
McDaniel, 2011), change package warning labels (Oswal,
Pednekar, & Gupta, 2010), and design excise tax increases
(Gilmore, 2012). These efforts extend to countries around the world
(Charoenca et al., 2012; Croghan et al., 2011; Holden & Lee, 2011;
Hurt, Ebbert, Achadi, & Croghan, 2012; Krasovsky, 2010; Shirane
et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2010). In addition, tobacco ﬁrms have
frequently recruited organizations that appeared unafﬁliated to
advocate on the industry’s behalf (Apollonio & Bero, 2007; Holden,
Lee, Gilmore, Fooks, & Wander, 2010; McDaniel & Malone, 2012).
Although the industry’s power is waning, tobacco companies
continue to successfully advocate to limit the scope of regulations
in the U.S. (Zajac, 2011).
Unusually, the tobacco industry’s motives and expectations can
at times be assessed directly. Most research on interest group
behavior has relied on interviews with interest group representa-
tives, whose statements may be limited by conﬂicts of interest or
conﬁdentiality concerns. However legal settlements in U.S.
required that 80 million pages of previously proprietary internal
tobacco industry documents be made publicly available. As a result
researchers gained access to information detailing the industry’s
political strategies (Malone & Balbach, 2000). Previous research has
found that the strategies discussed in these documents were often
carried out (Bero, Montini, Bryan-Jones, & Mangurian, 2001).
Data and methods
Our research relies on two sources of data: (1) internal tobacco
industry documents, which we used to evaluate tobacco industry
expectations about term limits, and (2) a database of campaign
contributionsmade by tobacco companies between 1988 and 2002.
Documents: Millions of previously proprietary internal tobacco
industry documents can be accessed by at thewebsite of the Legacy
Tobacco Documents Library (LTDL). Using established techniques
for systematically searching tobacco documents archives (Malone &
Balbach, 2000), we began with initial search terms on identiﬁers
such as “term limits”, and “initiatives” (term limits were passed by
state initiative). Searches were expanded with a snowball strategy,
using information from the initial searches to identify additional
search terms, including the names of individuals and organizations,
date ranges, places, and reference (Bates) numbers. We reviewed
688 internal tobacco industry documents pertaining to the tobacco
industry’s political strategy in the states, and 168 pertaining to term
limits in particular. We excluded documents that copied news re-
ports and listed initiatives without comment, retaining “weeklygovernment relations reports,” copies of checks written to legisla-
tors and interest groups, and memoranda detailing the search for
political allies or proposed lobbying activities at the state level.
Campaign contributions: Since the mid-1980s, researchers at the
University of California, San Francisco, have gathered detailed data
on campaign contributions made by tobacco companies and trade
associations in American states. Our analysis begins with the 1988
election cycle because it preceded the consideration or passage of
term limits. Unfortunately very few states have a complete time
series, and some states destroyed records for past election cycles.
Two states had both a complete time series and term limits in effect
and could be used in our analysis: California and Florida. In Cali-
fornia, term limits took full effect in 1996e1998, and in Florida,
term limits took full effect in 2000. Our analysis ends in 2002;
although data on campaign contributions are available after 2002,
due to signiﬁcant changes in state campaign ﬁnance law that
independently inﬂuenced industry spending, they are not included.
Ideally, we would also include measures of legislators’ political
ideology; unfortunately, no such measures exist at the state level,
and political parties differ so greatly across states that partisan
identiﬁcation is a poor substitute.
Because this analysis spanned from 1988 to 2002, all contribu-
tions were translated into 2002 real dollars. We used Consumer
Price Index (CPI) multipliers to control for inﬂation.Results
We ﬁrst considered the tobacco industry’s expectations about
the effect of term limits on their political inﬂuence, and how these
expectations informed tobacco companies’ political strategies.
Although tobacco companies compete among themselves for
market share, during the time period when term limits were
debated (roughly the late 1980s to early 1990s) the tobacco in-
dustry maintained a consistent political strategy (Glantz, Barnes,
Bero, Hanauer, & Slade, 1995; Glantz, Slade, Bero, Hanauer, &
Barnes, 1996). Until their dissolution in 1998 tobacco industry
trade associations like the Tobacco Institute organized most of the
industry’s political activity in the United States (Wilson, 1999).
The tobacco industry is highly centralized. The two largest
companies in the U.S., Philip Morris1 and R.J. Reynolds, account for
76% of all cigarette sales (Philip Morris USA, 2013; RJ Reynolds,
2013). However, these companies and the industry’s (now dis-
solved) political trade group, the Tobacco Institute, had different
expectations about the effects of term limits on the industry. Philip
Morris generally opposed term limits, R.J. Reynolds both supported
term limits and worked actively with organizations advocating for
their passage, and the Tobacco Institute was largely neutral. We
found no indication that the other major tobacco companies ever
speciﬁcally considered the issue, possibly because they left political
advocacy to the Tobacco Institute.
Philip Morris contributed money to anti-term limits campaigns
in at least two states, California andWashington. In 1992, when the
New York Times contacted Philip Morris about its involvement in
Washington, they were asked why they had made a contribution
opposing term limits. The company’s public relations representa-
tive considered several detailed answers, but eventually settled on,
“Because we believe that voters should decide.” (Han, 1991) In
addition, in the 2002 election cycle, the company contributed
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Fig. 2. Changes in total tobacco industry contributions in term limited states (in real
dollars). Source: Data aggregated from state records of campaign contributions
collected by the Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education at the University of
California, San Francisco, and by the authors. Note 1: Tobacco industry contributions to
state legislators in California decrease in gubernatorial election years, as money is
transferred from state legislative races to state executive races. When the spending on
state executives is included (in 1990, 1994, 1998, and 2002), the total spending on
California state political races ranges roughly between $1 million and $1.5 million for
all election cycles between 1990 and 2002. Note 2: Contributions to Florida state
legislators between 1990 and 2002 range from approximately $90,000 to $140,000 in
2002 real dollars in every election cycle other than 2000, differences at a comparable
magnitude, though a much lower level, to the California contributions.
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(Matier & Ross, 2002).
R.J. Reynolds, on the other hand, worked closely with term limits
advocates and recruited them as allies (Hoy & Schuman, 1994). In
1994, the company created a front group called Get Government Off
Our Back (GGOOB) through the public relations ﬁrm Mongoven,
Biscoe and Duchin to advocate against clean indoor air laws being
proposed in several states (Apollonio & Bero, 2007; Duchin &
Blumel, 1994). Because tobacco companies are widely viewed as
untrustworthy, the company did not wish to be known as the
creator of GGOOB and recruited several other interest groups,
including U.S. Term Limits, to claim that they had sponsored the
organization (RJ Reynolds, 1995). R.J. Reynolds also provided
funding for afﬁliates recruited as GGOOB coalition members
(Gomez, 1995).
The Tobacco Institute was aware of term limits but never took a
public position on them. However, it recruited observers to follow
state term limits restrictions and comment on the likelihood of
their passage (Spearman,1992). In contrast, a pro-smoking industry
ally and possible front group, FORCES (Americans for Nonsmokers’
Rights, 2003), indicated in a 1996 press release that “term limits irk
anti-smokers” because legislators who supported tobacco control
would lose their seats as term limits took effect (FORCES, 1997).
Reviewing the data on campaign contributions, however, sug-
gests that whatever reservations tobacco companies may have had
about term limits, they allowed increased industry access to leg-
islators. A larger percentage of legislators accepted tobacco in-
dustry contributions in the wake of term limits, though the overall
spending of the industry, in real dollars, remained stable.
Historically, most legislators in the states we consider, California
and Florida, were willing to accept tobacco industry campaign
contributions. In the 1990 election cycle, over half of all Florida
state legislators, and over 80% of all California state legislators, were
supported by tobacco industry funding (see Fig. 1). In the 1990s,
however, California legislators became increasingly unwilling to
accept tobacco money, possibly in response to the decreasing social
acceptability of smoking. By 1998, when term limits took full effectTerm limits
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Fig. 1. The percentage of state legislators taking tobacco industry contributions
increased after the institution of term limits. Source: Data aggregated from state re-
cords of campaign contributions collected by the Center for Tobacco Control Research
and Education at the University of California, San Francisco, and by the authors.in California, the percentage of legislators accepting tobacco in-
dustry campaign contributions had dropped to less than 40%. After
1998, sitting California legislators began terming out en masse. By
2002, over 60% of the new California legislators accepted tobacco
money. In Florida approximately half of state legislators accepted
tobacco industry contributions between 1990 and 1998, but in
2000, less than a third did. After 2000, half the Florida legislature
termed out. In 2002, half of the new Florida legislators received
tobacco industry funding.
The institution of term limits in California was associated with
increased acceptance of tobacco industry contributions by legisla-
tors. Before the institution of term limits, fewer legislators were
taking industry money in every election. After the institution of
term limits, more legislators accepted tobacco industry funding in
every election. In Florida, fewer legislators received tobacco in-
dustry contributions the year that term limits took effect. After half
of sitting legislators lost their seats to term limits in 2000, the share
of new legislators accepting tobacco money immediately returned
to historic levels, erasing the drop in tobacco-supported candidates
in the prior election. Overall, these data suggest that passage of
term limits did not compromise tobacco industry access to legis-
lators, and may have increased it. These data lend support to our
ﬁrst hypothesis, which claimed that interest groups would
contribute to a larger percentage of legislators after the institution
of term limits, increasing rather than decreasing their access to
state legislatures.
Our expectation that the tobacco industry would have to spend
more money to gain increased access was not borne out (see Fig. 2).
The tobacco industry made its greatest contributions in California,
in real dollars, in the 1996 election cycle, and total legislative
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years after the institution of term limits. (The tobacco industry
redirects money state legislative races to executive races in Cali-
fornia gubernatorial election years, so comparable election cycles
are four years prior.) Similarly, in Florida, the level of spending in
the 2002 election cycle was less than in any prior election cycle
between 1990 and 1996.
Term limits advocates claimed that interest groups would
reduce contributions to term limited legislatures, and overall this
appears to be the case. However these lower overall contributions
appear to be correlated with greater access to individual legislators.Discussion
Advocates for term limits (many of which were funded by the
tobacco industry) claimed that interest group power would be
attenuated under term limits (Crane et al., 2001). Research suggests
that interest groups make campaign contributions to gain inﬂuence
with legislators (Apollonio, 2010; Haider-Markel, 1999; Magee,
2002). Limited terms were billed in part as a form of campaign
ﬁnance reform. Advocates argued that interest groups would
oppose legislative term limits because they threatened the re-
lationships groups had cultivated with senior members of state
legislatures. Yet those groups, including tobacco companies, had
split expectations about term limits’ potential effects.
We anticipated that term limits would have a leveling effect on
legislatures. Interest groups would be required to spread contri-
butions more widely because term limits would make it more
difﬁcult to concentrate spending on senior legislators who histor-
ically had enormous control over the policy making process. We
also anticipated that interest groups would be forced to spend
more. This outcome seemed especially likely given that the costs of
elections have steadily increased over time.
Our ﬁndings suggest that the effects of term limits on interest
group campaign contributions were mixed. Advocates were correct
that interest groups made smaller contributions to legislators.
However interest groups also distributed their campaign contri-
butions far more broadly within the legislature. In combination,
these two ﬁndings make it difﬁcult to be sanguine about the effects
of term limits on interest group power in state legislatures. This is
particularly the case given that our study focused on tobacco. The
tobacco industry has grown increasingly unpopular over time. Yet
before the institution of term limits, fewer legislators were willing
to accept money from the tobacco industry.
Our study has several limitations. State level data on legislators
and campaign contributions are sparse, and did not allow for a
multivariate analysis. In addition, California and Florida are both
full-time, professional legislatures, which made it possible to
gather complete data on contributions. However this raises ques-
tions about whether the campaign contributions made in these
states are comparable to those in states with part-time legislatures.
Members of professional legislators, through long apprenticeships,
develop expertise and independent political power relative to other
branches of government, including potential campaign contribu-
tors (Polsby, 1968). Term limits remake “professional” (where
representatives have long tenures, meet year-round, and make a
career of public service) legislatures into “citizen” legislatures
(where representatives serve brieﬂy, meet once a year or biennially,
and have other jobs) (National Conference of State Legislatures,
2009). In citizen legislatures, the long tenure needed to develop
professional expertise is rarely possible. As a result, term limited
legislatures are vulnerable to lobbyist inﬂuence: some new legis-
lators admit that over 90% of their bills are drafted or given to them
by their campaign contributors (Alexandar, 2011; Cain & Kousser,2005). Our ﬁndings suggest that tobacco industry inﬂuence may
have increased as well.
The hope that term limits would decrease interest group access
has not been borne out. After the institution of term limits, newly
elected legislators were far more likely to receive tobacco industry
support. This shift occurred even in the face of a continuing decline
in the social acceptability of tobacco products and their manufac-
turers. For industries without the same stigma, the opportunities to
gain access to legislators were probably greater. Overall, term limits
appear to have done little to limit interest group power.Acknowledgments
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